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n recent years, the courts have determined 
that business methods can be patented and 
the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office has granted some 12,000 patents 
of this sort. Has the availability of patents for business 
methods increased the rate of innovation in the U.S. 
financial sector? The available evidence suggests that 
there has been no significant change in the aggregate 
trend of R&D investments made by financial firms. 
In this article, Bob Hunt discusses how recent court 
decisions and proposed federal legislation may change 
how firms enforce their patents. In addition, he outlines 
some of the remaining challenges that business method 
patents pose for financial companies.
A decade has passed since Ameri-
can courts made clear that methods 
of doing business could be patented. 
Since then, the U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office (USPTO) has granted 
more than 12,000 of these patents, 
of which only a small share has been 
obtained by financial firms. A num-
ber of lawsuits have been filed, and a 
number of financial settlements, some 
involving significant sums of money, 
have occurred. 
Has the availability of patents for 
business methods increased the rate of 
innovation in the U.S. financial sector? 
This is a difficult question to answer, 
in part because our official measures 
are not well suited for estimating 
research activity in financial services. 
Nevertheless, the available evidence 
suggests that there has been no signifi-
cant change in the aggregate trend of 
R&D investments made by financial 
firms. 
Business method patents are 
probably here to stay. But recent court 
decisions and proposed federal legisla-
tion are likely to change how firms 
enforce their patents. These changes 
should mitigate some of the concerns 
raised about business method patents: 
that the claimed inventions are not 
new, are not sufficiently novel to justify 
the award of a patent, and are being 
enforced in ways that increase busi-
ness risk to financial firms. Neverthe-
less, significant challenges remain. In 
particular, the boundaries of the rights 
being granted in at least some business 
method patents are not sufficiently 
clear. Ambiguity over these boundaries 
creates uncertainty for both the own-
ers of these patents and their competi-
tors.  
BACKGROUND
A patent is a grant of the legal 
right to exclude others from making, 
using, or selling the patented invention 
for a limited period of time. If the pat-
ent is infringed, the patent owner may 
sue the infringer to recover lost profits. 
Sometimes the patent owner is able to 
obtain an injunction — a court order 
that prevents the alleged infringer 
from continuing to make, use, or sell 
the patented invention. For reasons 
described below, an injunction is a 
very powerful legal weapon in patent 
litigation.
But not all inventions qualify 
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invention must satisfy a number of 
statutory requirements, including what 
the law describes as nonobviousness. 
This prevents the grant of a patent 
for an invention that would have 
been obvious to a practitioner in the 
relevant field at the time the invention 
was made. In other words, a patentable 
invention must be more than a trivial 
extension of what is already known 
(the prior art).
As an example, consider one of 
the patents examined in the Supreme 
Court decision in Graham v. Deere.1 
The claimed invention was a com-
bined sprayer and cap used on bottles 
of household chemicals. The essen-
tial elements of the sprayer had been 
developed by others, but they had 
never been assembled in this particular 
way, which made possible the use of 
automated bottling equipment. As a 
result, the product was highly suc-
cessful. While the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that long-felt need and 
commercial success might suggest the 
invention was nonobvious, in the end 
it decided otherwise because the dif-
ferences between the product’s design 
and that of pre-existing products were 
minimal.
Patentable Subject Matter. In 
the U.S., assuming the criteria just de-
scribed are also satisfied, any process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition 
of matter, or any improvement of those 
things can be patented. But the courts 
have also identified certain categories 
of subject matter that cannot be pat-
ented, for example, laws of nature and 
abstract ideas.  
For at least 80 years, it was com-
monly believed that these limitations 
precluded patenting methods of doing 
business. This view was suddenly 
upended by the Federal Circuit’s State 
Street decision in 1998.2 That case 
involved a patent on a data processing 
system that made possible the pooling 
of assets in several mutual funds into 
a single portfolio, reducing overhead 
costs while maintaining the transac-
tion information necessary for allocat-
ing gains, losses, and tax liabilities to 
the original funds. The district court 
determined that the invention in 
question was a business method and 
was therefore unpatentable. But the 
Federal Circuit concluded that, under 
U.S. law, there was no such thing as a 
subject matter exception for business 
methods.
Business Method Patenting 
Grows Rapidly. The State Street deci-
sion had an almost immediate effect 
in terms of patenting behavior. About 
1,000 patents for computer-implemented 
business methods were granted in each 
year after 1999 (Figure 1). Some ex-
amples are found in 10 Business Method 
Patents Granted in 2008. An inspection 
of random business method patents 
reveals that many are not directly 
related to the financial industry (there 
are many patents on postage-metering 
systems, for example). Nevertheless, 
half or more of all the patents depicted 
in Figure 1 fall into categories of tech-
nology directly related to the provision 
of financial services. In addition, the 
vast majority of business method pat-
ents (roughly four in five) would also 
qualify as software patents.3
Classifying the industrial mix of 
the owners of business method patents 
can be difficult. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that when compared with firms in 
the information and communications 
technology sector (for example, com-
puters, software, and communications 
equipment), financial institutions are 
relatively minor players. Very roughly 
speaking, manufacturers of electronics, 
computers, instruments, and soft-
ware account for at least a third, and 
likely much more, of business method 
patents granted in the last five years.4 
In contrast, and again speaking very 
roughly, financial firms and providers 
of consumer payment services account 
for less than one-tenth of the total. 
Nevertheless, a number of financial 
institutions have accumulated a dozen 
or more these patents.5 
1 The Supreme Court wrote a combined decision 
for three patent cases. The patent I describe 
here was at issue in Calmar, Inc. v. Cook 
Chemical Co.
2 See also the Federal Circuit opinion in AT&T 
v. Excel Communications. The Federal Circuit 
is the sole court of appeals from federal district 
courts for patent cases. Federal Circuit decisions 
can be appealed to the Supreme Court.
In the U.S. any process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any 
improvement of those things can be patented. 
But the courts have also identiﬁed certain 
categories of subject matter that cannot be 
patented.
3 See the data appendix for definitions and 
additional information. 
4 The leading recipients include IBM, Sony, 
Hewlett-Packard, Fujitsu, Hitachi, NCR, and 
Microsoft. 
5 Among others, these include American 
Express, Citibank, JPMorgan Chase, Capital 
One, and Goldman Sachs.  Business Review  Q3  2008   23 www.philadelphiafed.org
TABLE
10 Business Method Patents Granted in 2008
Description* Company**
A method and system for predicting changes in interest-rate sensitivity induced 
by changes in economic factors that affect the duration of assets and liabilities, 
including core deposits (no. 7,328,179).
McGuire Performance 
Solutions, Inc.
A method and system for calculating marginal cost curves for electricity generating 
plants (no. 7,333,861).
NeuCo, Inc.
A method of selecting sector weights and particular securities for a stock portfolio 
(no. 7,340,425).
First Trust Portfolios
A system and method of calculating prepayment and default risk, loss given 
default, and default correlations for the purpose of valuing a portfolio of assets (no. 
7,340,431).
Freddie Mac
A machine and computer program that enables the pricing of auto insurance 




A system and method for trading pollution emission allowances (no. 7,343,341).
Chicago Climate 
Exchange, Inc.
A computer-implemented method of computing price elasticities, choosing from 
one or more demand models based on goodness of fit (no. 7,343,355)
i2 Technologies US, Inc.
A method of assessing the capital adequacy of an automotive finance company (no. 
7,346,566).
Ford Motor Company
A method of creating a customized payment card, based on a consumer’s 
instructions/images, via a website (no. 7,360,692).
AT&T Delaware 
Intellectual Property, Inc.
A method of sharing the profits generated by a payment card program, in excess of 
some target, with users of the card (no. 7,360,693).
JPMorgan Chase Bank, 
N.A.
* The author’s interpretation, based on the patent’s claims or description of the invention
** Initial assignee on the patent documentBetween 1997 and 1999, new ap-
plications for business method patents 
tripled, and they have more than 
tripled since then. Today about 11,000 
new applications for patents on busi-
ness methods are filed each year, which 
suggests that there will be significant 
future growth in the number of patents 
granted. Over 40,000 of these applica-
tions are currently pending. 
ARE FINANCIAL SERVICES 
SPECIAL?
An important question to ask is 
whether there are characteristics of 
the financial services sector that might 
make us think differently about how 
intellectual property influences deci-
sions and outcomes among financial 
firms. For example, how do these 
firms protect their innovations in the 
absence of patents? Are there special 
interactions between network effects, 
which are important in many areas 
of finance, and intellectual property? 
What challenges does intellectual 
property pose for standard-setting, 
which is essential for coordinating the 
interactions of hundreds, if not thou-
sands, of financial institutions acting 
on behalf of millions of clients?
Protecting Innovations in the 
Financial Sector. In many theoretical 
papers, patents are considered essential 
for protecting the fruits of innovation. 
Without them, inventions might be 
quickly copied by imitators, leaving the 
inventor without a means of recover-
ing her costs. This would reduce the 
incentive to do R&D in the first place 
and hence the rate of innovation. 
In practice, however, firms employ 
other means of protecting their in-
novations. Surveys of manufacturing 
companies in the 1980s and 1990s re-
port that only a few industries (chemi-
cals and pharmaceuticals) view patents 
as the primary means of protecting 
the profits generated by an invention.6 
Other factors, such as lead time or 
proprietary knowledge maintained as 
a trade secret, were typically ranked as 
more important than patents.7 In ad-
dition, firms in most industries viewed 
their investments in specific manufac-
turing capabilities, reputation, brand 
names, and distribution networks as 
more important mechanisms than 
patents for protecting their innova-
tions. Such investments are sometimes 
described as complementary assets. 
Consider the example of the semicon-
ductor firm Intel. While the firm in-
vests heavily in patents, much of Intel’s 
success is derived from its ability to 
design and build new factories (which 
produce only the latest CPU chips) 
24   Q3  2008 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
 
6 See the working paper by Wesley Cohen, 
Richard Nelson, and John Walsh. Evidence 
from earlier surveys is found in Edwin 
Mansfield’s article and the article by Richard 
Levin and his co-authors. 
7 A trade secret is certain confidential 
information, such as a formula or a production 
technique, that a firm tries to keep from 
being disclosed. The firm can sue a person (or 
another company) for stealing or disclosing 
this information, but it cannot prevent others 
from independently discovering and using such 
knowledge.
8 These are described in William Silber’s article, 
Peter Tufano’s 1989 article, and John Caskey’s 
working paper. For a recent review of the 
literature on financial innovation, see Tufano’s 
2003 book chapter.
Calendar Year Patent Was Granted
FIGURE 1
Business Method Patents*
Source: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and author’s calculations
* These are patents in Class 705 (Data Processing: Financial, Business Practice, Management, or 
Cost/Price Determination) in the USPTO’s patent classification system. The 2008 total is esti-
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While those surveys focused on 
manufacturing firms, other researchers 
have documented similar lessons for 
innovations in financial services. For 
example, despite rapid imitation there 
appears to be persistent first-mover ad-
vantages (reflected primarily in market 
share) among firms developing new 
securities or option contracts.8 Some 
studies find that larger investment 
banks and mutual fund companies 
tend to innovate more frequently than 
smaller ones. This pattern is consistent 
with the idea that financial firms are 
able to leverage complementary assets 
to protect their innovations.9
In conclusion, it appears that 
financial firms typically protect their 
innovations in much the same way as 
do manufacturing firms. Historically, 
patents have not been a significant 
part of the story for financial firms, 
and yet their absence has not pre-
vented them from investing in new 
products (financial instruments) or the 
processes required to offer them. The 
question is then whether the addition 
of financial patents to the mix can 
improve on the existing incentives and 
thus increase the rate of innovation in 
this sector. 
Network Effects and Standards. 
Many financial markets are subject to 
network effects: Users find the services 
provided are more valuable when there 
are many other users of the service. 
Two obvious examples include pay-
ment systems and financial exchanges. 
Consumers are more willing to carry a 
payment card when they know it will 
be accepted by most of the merchants 
they frequent. Merchants are more 
willing to incur costs to accept a 
payment card if they know there are 
many potential customers who want 
to use them. In the case of financial 
exchanges, efficiency is often deter-
mined by the number of active buyers 
and sellers of a security. This creates a 
tendency to concentrate trading of an 
instrument on just a few (or even one) 
exchanges. As these examples suggest, 
networks are difficult to start, but once 
they attain a critical mass, they often 
enjoy a large market share and gener-
ate considerable income.  
Network effects also arise from 
the requirements of interoperability, 
which is extremely important in fi-
nancial services. Interoperability is ac-
complished via standard setting, where 
industry participants agree on techni-
cal features so that their systems can 
work together. Two examples are the 
specification of the layout and num-
bering systems of paper checks and the 
message formats used by automated 
clearinghouse (ACH) networks for 
direct deposit of paychecks and other 
transactions.
 Network effects have two implica-
tions for thinking about patents. First, 
they are an example of complemen-
tary assets that may permit financial 
institutions (or networks) to protect 
their innovations even in the absence 
of strong intellectual property rights. 
Second, networks are vulnerable to 
hold-up by third parties who own 
patents allegedly infringed by members 
of the network. Hold-up means that 
a patent owner may obtain an injunc-
tion, effectively shutting down the 
network. This puts the patent owner in 
a strong bargaining position in licens-
ing negotiations. It is possible, then, 
for the patent owner to obtain income 
in excess of the incremental value 
created by the underlying invention. 
The source of that additional income 
is the value created by the size of the 
established network.
Consider the case of Research in 
Motion (RIM), not only the developer 
of the BlackBerry but also the builder 
of the servers and software that make 
it work. RIM was sued by a patent-
holding company, NTP, whose primary 
investment was its portfolio of patents. 
RIM, on the other hand, had invested 
about $1 billion in property, equip-
ment, and R&D. NTP won the case 
and was eventually granted an injunc-
tion that would shut down the RIM 
network in the U.S. This induced RIM 
to settle the litigation for about $600 
million. Ironically, while NTP was very 
successful in court, the U.S. patent of-
fice, on re-examination, rejected many 
of NTP’s patent claims.10  
A similar problem can arise with 
standard setting, since firms have lim-
ited options to make technical changes 
without sacrificing interoperability. 
Suppose a third party subsequently 
obtains a patent that is infringed by 
firms complying with the standard. 
The patent owner may enjoy consider-
able bargaining power. This is espe-
cially the case when implementing the 
standard requires significant up-front 
investments that firms will be hesitant 
to abandon simply to avoid infringing 
the patent.
A key concern here is the effect 
of such risks on dynamic incentives. 
Companies may not be aware of all 
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9 See Tufano’s 1989 article and his 1993 book 
chapter with Erik Sirri.  
Network effects 
also arise from the 
requirements of 
interoperability, which 
is extremely important 
in ﬁnancial services.
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of the patents that may arise and 
who owns them, at the time they are 
required to make their investment 
decisions. The risk of potential hold-up 
may discourage firms from investing 
in the first place. Such lost investment 
would be particularly costly, since it 
would otherwise enhance the network 
and, in turn, reinforce the positive ex-
ternalities that network effects convey. 
Alternatively, such risk may increase 
the barriers that must be overcome in 
order for a network to reach a critical 
mass. In other words, some networks 
might never form.11
HAS THE AVAILABILITY OF 
BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS 
INCREASED FINANCIAL 
INNOVATION?
It is always difficult to establish a 
cause-and-effect relationship between 
a policy change and subsequent 
economic outcomes. This is especially 
difficult in this case because there is 
no systematic data on the volume of 
these innovations over time. Ordinar-
ily changes in the number of patents 
might be used. But in this case such 
changes might simply reflect the 
fact that obtaining business method 
patents became much easier after the 
decision in State Street.   
Measuring R&D. If the outputs 
of financial innovation are difficult to 
measure, another approach is to exam-
ine changes in the inputs, specifically 
research and development (R&D). 
The first items to look at, then, are the 
measures of R&D spending obtained 
from the National Science Founda-
tion’s (NSF) regular survey of private 
firms. The NSF has published these 
data for most years since 1958. It began 
reporting R&D statistics for firms in 
finance, insurance, and real estate 
(FIRE) only in 1995. Its most recent 
estimate (2006) of R&D spending for 
this group of industries was only $2 
billion, compared with more than $220 
billion for all industries.   
The NSF reports that the majority 
(58 percent) of R&D spending in FIRE 
in 2003 was for computer software. 
The financial sector’s focus on soft-
ware R&D is consistent with the mix 
of investment goods it purchases. In 
1997, for example, companies in FIRE 
bought $30 billion in computers and 
software, making it the largest business 
customer of the information technol-
ogy sector (accounting for 19 percent 
of sales). More than three-quarters of 
financial-sector investment, excluding 
structures, was devoted to the informa-
tion, communication, and technology 
sector.12
Economists often examine R&D 
by comparing the size of these invest-
ments relative to sales or employment 
in the industry. According to the NSF 
data, financial services, including 
real estate, are significantly less R&D 
intensive than private industry as a 
whole (Figure 2). By these measures, 
the private economy as a whole enjoys 
a research intensity more than five 
times that of financial services. And 
while the R&D intensity of the U.S. 
economy has risen gradually over time, 
there has been no apparent change in 
the R&D intensity of financial services 
(the obvious spike in 2000 may reflect 
intense rewriting of computer code 
to address the century-date-change 
problem).  
It is quite possible that the NSF’s 
estimates for the financial sector do 
not reflect all of the R&D activity 
11 For a more detailed discussion, see my working 
paper with Samuli Simojoki and Tuomas 
Takalo.
12 These statistics are from the article by 
Douglas Meade and his co-authors.  
FIGURE 2
Research Intensity (R&D/Sales)
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that is actually occurring. The NSF’s 
methodology and the definition of 
R&D employed are derived from a 
long tradition of surveying R&D man-
agers at manufacturing firms. In that 
sector, R&D facilities are relatively 
easy to identify, and members of senior 
management know who their R&D 
managers are. These factors make it 
relatively easy to conduct a survey of 
R&D patterns among manufacturing 
firms. For most financial institutions, 
the terms R&D, R&D lab, and R&D 
manager are largely foreign concepts.13 
For example, in 2006 only six publicly 
traded financial firms reported any 
R&D in their financial statements, and 
the total amount they reported was 
only $65 million.14 No publicly held 
bank or insurance company reported 
doing any R&D in that year. 
The activities associated with 
developing new financial products, 
or better ways of delivering them, 
often fall outside the definition of 
R&D applied by official agencies. For 
example, a number of tax-court deci-
sions conclude that research carried 
out by financial firms does not satisfy 
the IRS’s definition of R&D. The NSF 
excludes from its definition of R&D 
“other nontechnological activities…
and research in the social sciences.”15 
The development of a better credit 
scoring model or a new derivative 
contract would likely fall outside this 
definition.
Measuring Research Workers. 
Other data may shed additional light 
on both the level and the trend in 
R&D being performed in this sector. 
To do that, I compare the composition 
of the workforce in financial services 
with that of the private economy as 
a whole. This may be a particularly 
informative measure for financial 
services, since 80 percent of R&D 
costs in this sector consist of wages 
and fringe benefits.16 The strategy is 
to identify those occupations that are 
most likely to be used for research and 
to count the number of these workers 
among financial services firms. 
To do that, I rely on the Occupa-
tional Employment Statistics produced 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. I 
defined a set of occupations I’ll call 
research occupations. This set includes 
all types of engineers and computer 
programmers and all scientists (includ-
ing social scientists) and research 
managers.17 Physicians, teachers, and 
technicians in any of the above fields 
were excluded. Of course, not all work-
ers in these occupations and employed 
by financial firms are actually engaged 
in R&D; in fact, most are probably 
not. But I expect that this is also true 
of other industries. As long as the ratio 
of actual R&D workers to my broader 
measure remains constant over time, 
the broader measure should accurately 
capture any trend. 
For 2005, my occupational data 
identify about 3.2 million potential 
research workers. In that year, the NSF 
identified 1.1 million R&D workers in 
all industries (see the first column of 
Figure 3).18 In other words, for every 
three workers in these research oc-
cupations there was an R&D worker in 
the NSF counts. In financial services, 
my occupational measure identifies 
about 147,100 potential research work-
ers in 2005, which is roughly five times 
the number of R&D workers (30,200) 
found by the NSF (see the second 
column of Figure 3). 
In the financial sector, about two-
thirds of potential research workers 
were either computer programmers or 
software engineers. The other third 
were actuaries, operations research-
ers, market researchers, or social 
scientists — occupations less likely to 
be reflected in the NSF counts, since 
work in these fields is not counted as 
R&D. In contrast, in all industries, 85 
percent of potential research workers 
were engineers, programmers, or non-
social scientists.
The NSF count of R&D work-
ers in the financial sector is likely to 
understate the actual number. As 
described in the previous section, 
13 For additional discussion of the issues in 
measuring R&D in finance and other service 
industries, see the 2005 National Research 
Council report and the report by Michael 
Gallaher, Albert Link, and Jeffrey Petrusa.
14 These data are from Standard & Poor’s 
Compustat.  
15 The instructions for the survey forms used 
in the NSF survey of industrial R&D explicitly 
exclude the following listed categories: 
economics, expert systems, market research, 
actuarial and demographic research, and R&D 
in law.  
16 That statistic is derived from NSF data for 
2002. The comparable share for all private firms 
is 53 percent.
17 See the appendix for a more complete list of 





or better ways of 
delivering them, 
often fall outside the 
deﬁnition of R&D 
applied by ofﬁcial 
agencies.
18 By R&D worker, I mean the count of (full-
time equivalent) scientists and engineers 
engaged in R&D as reported in the NSF survey 
of industrial R&D. The survey instructions 
indicate that the count should include “all 
persons engaged in scientific or engineering 
work at a level that requires knowledge of 
physical or life sciences or engineering or 
mathematics.”this may result from the definition 
of R&D used and the greater dif-
ficulty in identifying where R&D is 
performed in financial organizations. 
A very crude estimate of the number 
of additional R&D workers in finance 
can be constructed using the relation-
ships between my data and the NSF 
data for all industries. If those relation-
ships also hold true in finance, there 
might have been another 20,000 R&D 
workers in that sector in 2005 (see the 
second column of Figure 3).19 About 
half of this amount may be attributable 
to the higher share of nontechnologi-
cal occupations among workers who 
may be involved in developing new 
products or processes.  
Just as with R&D spending, we 
can create a measure of research 
intensity by calculating the share of an 
industry’s workforce that falls into the 
occupations included in my definition 
of potential research workers (Figure 
4). There are several striking patterns. 
First, the potential research share of 
the financial workforce is about the 
same as for private industry as a whole. 
Second, after 1999, there is a rising 
trend for the entire economy. The 
pattern is more mixed in financial 
services, with increases in some years 
offset by declines in other years.20 
The occupation-based measure of 
research intensity can be broken down 
to examine patterns within differ-
ent segments of the financial services 
sector (Figure 5). Again, there does 
not appear to be a consistent trend for 
any of these five industries, but there 
are persistent differences across them. 
Using somewhat older data, we can 
examine even finer industry counts. 
In 2001, for example, insurance firms 
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19 Details on these calculations are found in the 
data appendix.
20 The BLS introduced a new occupational 
taxonomy in 1999, so we should be cautious 




Source: Author’s calculations using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and National Sci-
ence Foundation
* Potential research workers include programmers, software engineers, actuaries, mathematicians, 
operations researchers, statisticians, architects, cartographers, surveyors, all engineers, and all 
life, physical, or social scientists. Estimates of additional financial R&D workers assume that the 
true ratio of NSF R&D workers to potential research workers in financial services is identical to 
the ratio for all private industries (34 percent). About half of this amount may result from under-
counting R&D workers who are actuaries, operations or market researchers, or social scientists. 
The remainder is categorized as potentially missing. See the appendix for additional information.
FIGURE 4
Potential Research Workers*
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and author’s calculations
* Potential research workers include programmers, software engineers, actuaries, mathematicians, 
operations researchers, statisticians, architects, cartographers, surveyors, all engineers, and all 
life, physical, or social scientists.
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Share of workforce (Percent)accounted for nearly half (48 percent) 
of potential research workers, followed 
by commercial banks (20 percent) and 
investment banks (12 percent).
Do these data suggest that the 
financial services sector enjoys the 
same research intensity as other parts 
of the economy? Probably not. We 
know from NSF data that, compared 
with all private industries, financial 
firms spend significantly less on R&D 
per research worker.21 Adjusting for 
this difference, it would appear that 
financial services has a research inten-
sity (roughly 1.3 percent) that is about 
40 percent of that found in private 
industry as a whole. Still, this would be 
2.5 times higher than reported in the 
NSF statistics.  
What can we conclude? First, the 
financial services sector is likely more 
research intensive than is reflected in 
the more traditional measures. Second, 
there is no clear trend in the research 
intensity of this industry. If financial 
patenting is having an effect, it is not 
easily discerned in any of the R&D 
measures presented. Finally, NSF data 
and my occupation-based measures 
show that ICT (especially software) are 
important technologies developed and 
employed in financial services.
PATENT LITIGATION 
While there is little evidence of a 
change in R&D patterns in the indus-
try, patent litigation involving financial 
firms has increased. In perhaps the 
first systematic study of suits involving 
financial business method patents, Josh 
Lerner found that they are litigated 
at a rate 27 times higher than patents 
in general.22 Defendants in these suits 
were typically large financial services 
firms or one of the financial exchang-
es. Plaintiffs were typically not finan-
cial companies. In several instances, 
they were patent-holding companies. 
In other words, they were not actively 
engaged in providing goods or services. 
Instead, they specialized in asserting, 
and sometimes litigating, patents. It 
also means they couldn’t be counter-
sued for infringing someone else’s 
patents.   
Litigious plaintiffs have obtained 
significant damage awards and licens-
ing revenues. These are usually paid by 
very large financial institutions or the 
technology companies that serve them. 
For example, in January 2006, the 
Lending Tree Exchange was found to 
infringe a patent on a method and sys-
tem for making loan applications and 
placing them up for bid by potential 
lenders. The jury awarded $5.8 million 
in damages to the plaintiff, IMX, an 
award that was increased 50 percent in 
subsequent proceedings in the district 
court. In an unrelated case, the three 
American futures exchanges settled 
infringement suits, each involving the 
same patent, collectively paying about 
$50 million in licensing fees.23
Litigation Affecting Consumer 
Payments. Another important ex-
ample of patent litigation involves the 
application of new technologies to an 
old payment instrument — the paper 
check. Check imaging and exchange 
technologies are especially important 
in the U.S. at this time. The Check 
Clearing for the 21st Century Act of 




Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and author’s calculations
* Potential research workers include programmers, software engineers, actuaries, mathematicians, 
operations researchers, statisticians, architects, cartographers, surveyors, all engineers, and all life, 
physical, or social scientists.
21 NSF data for 2003 show that for every dollar 
of R&D spent per full-time researcher in all 
industries, financial firms spent less than 40 
cents. While some of this disparity may be due 
to the definitional issues described earlier, it’s 
unlikely they explain the entire difference. 
23 See the article by Mark Young and Gregory 
Corbett. 
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2003 (Check 21) permits banks to 
process check transactions without 
physically presenting the original 
check to the issuing bank, so long as 
certain standards are satisfied.24 Finan-
cial institutions are making very large 
investments in technology in order to 
take advantage of the efficiencies af-
forded by this law.
In January 2006, a company called 
DataTreasury sued Wells Fargo, 56 
other banks, and a number of other 
firms that participate in the check-im-
age clearing process. The company also 
sued the Clearing House Payments 
Co., which operates a check-image 
exchange network. DataTreasury owns 
at least six patents on processes for 
creating, processing, and storing digital 
images of paper checks. In earlier years 
it had sued a number of institutions 
and obtained licensing agreements 
with firms such as JPMorgan Chase, 
Merrill Lynch, and ATM manufacturer 
NCR Corporation. More recently, the 
ATM manufacturer Diebold struck a 
licensing agreement with DataTreasury 
in part to assuage bank customers who 
have grown increasingly concerned 
about their potential liability for patent 
infringement.25  
SHIFTING SANDS?
While financial patents are likely 
here to stay in the United States, they 
will be affected by a number of recent 
Supreme Court decisions and, quite 
possibly, new federal legislation. For 
the most part, this activity is prompted 
by more general concerns about the 
efficacy of our patent system, but some 
proposals are specifically directed at 
business method patents. For example, 
a patent reform bill (H.R. 1908) 
passed by the House of Representa-
tives in 2007 would make tax-planning 
methods unpatentable subject matter. 
In 2008, the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee reported a bill (S. 1145) that 
included an amendment intended to 
preclude patent infringement claims 
against institutions processing checks 
in compliance with the requirements 
of Check 21.26  
The Supreme Court Speaks. In 
2006 the Supreme Court decided a 
case involving a patent owned by the 
company MercExchange that a federal 
district court determined was infringed 
by eBay’s “Buy it Now” feature on its 
auction website. The question was 
whether, in addition to damages, 
MercExchange was also entitled to an 
injunction preventing eBay’s ongoing 
use of this feature. On appeal, the 
Federal Circuit concluded that injunc-
tions should be denied to a successful 
plaintiff in patent cases only under 
exceptional circumstances. The Su-
preme Court disagreed, pointing to its 
traditional balancing test for determin-
ing the appropriateness of a permanent 
injunction. On retrial, the original 
court concluded that an injunction 
was not warranted.27 
In 2007 the Supreme Court 
decided what may become the most 
important patent case in at least a 
decade. In KSR International v. Teleflex, 
the court considered how to determine 
whether an invention consisting of a 
combination of pre-existing elements 
is obvious and therefore unpatentable. 
With inventions like this, courts worry 
about the problem of hindsight bias: 
A novel combination of the elements 
seems more obvious once it has been 
tried and proven to work. To prevent 
this, the Federal Circuit created limita-
tions on how the prior art could be in-
terpreted to suggest that an invention 
was obvious. Unless a piece of prior 
art actually suggested the combination 
of ideas, the Federal Circuit typically 
concluded the invention was not obvi-
ous. At the extreme, to demonstrate 
obviousness, all the relevant aspects of 
the new combination must be men-
tioned in a single piece of prior art. 
Such an approach has been criti-
cized for being too permissive, since it 
presumes that a person of ordinary skill 
in the art has little ability or creativity. 
Some legal scholars and economists 
have argued that the standard should 
be related to the rate of technical 
progress in the field. If the standard is 
too low, the result is less innovation in 
those industries that ought to be the 
most innovative.28 Without specifi-
cally articulating a more appropriate 
standard, a unanimous Supreme Court 
concluded that the Federal Circuit had 
set the bar too low: “In many fields 
there may be little discussion of obvi-
ous techniques or combinations, and 
market demand, rather than scientific 
literature, may often drive design 
trends. Granting patent protection to 
advances that would occur in the or-
dinary course without real innovation 
retards progress and may, for patents 
combining previously known elements, 
deprive prior inventions of their value 
or utility.”
Business method patents are 
already feeling the effects of this deci- 24 Public Law 108-100, 12 U.S.C. 5001.  
25 See the article by Steve Bills. There are at 
least 63 issued U.S. patents and 123 published 
patent applications that contain one or more 
references to the phrase Check 21.
26 A cost estimate for the bill, prepared by the 
Congressional Budget Office, suggests that 
the affected patent holders would likely sue 
the federal government for a taking of private 
property. If those suits were successful, CBO 
estimates that the resulting compensation 
payments could be as high as $1 billion. 
   
27 Permanent injunctions in patent cases have 
not disappeared. In his article, Keith Slenkovich 
identifies 22 district court decisions after eBay 
where an injunction was awarded. 
 
28 See, for example, the article by John Barton 
and my 2007 law review article. 
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sion. In one case (in re Trans Texas 
Holdings), several issued patents for a 
system of inflation-adjusted deposit 
and loan accounts were rejected on re-
examination, and the Federal Circuit 
upheld the decision. The rejection was 
based on an allegedly obvious combi-
nation of two pieces of prior art. The 
first was a book chapter that described 
how, in the 1950s, Finnish banks 
would adjust their loan and deposit 
accounts for the actual inflation that 
had occurred. The second was a patent 
granted in 1983 that described how to 
use a data processor (for example, a 
computer) to manage a set of accounts. 
In a separate case (Advanceme Inc v. 
Rapidpay), a district court invalidated 
a patent on a computerized method for 
securing a loan using future credit card 
receivables, arguing that the claimed 
invention was a predictable variation 
of at least five card programs already in 
existence.
Congress Deliberates. For a num-
ber of years, there has been consider-
able debate over the efficacy of the 
patent system in facilitating innovation 
in high-technology industries that 
tend to innovate cumulatively.29 This 
stands in contrast to the view that in 
other industries, such as chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals, where innovations 
tend to be more discrete, the patent 
system seems to be functioning reason-
ably well. From this debate a consensus 
is emerging in favor of some limited 
reforms. Other proposals are more 
controversial.
Two proposals are particularly 
relevant for business method patents. 
The first is designed to increase the 
quality of patents issued by increasing 
the information available to the patent 
office. That information is likely to 
come from interested third parties if 
they are afforded the opportunity to 
contest the issuance of a pending or re-
cently granted patent (these are called 
opposition procedures). 
Limited forms of these procedures 
exist under current law, but they are 
used infrequently. One proposal would 
reduce certain disadvantages that a 
third party might experience in any 
subsequent litigation involving the pat-
ent. Under the current post-grant pro-
cedure (inter partes re-examination), 
a third party is precluded from using 
any argument in subsequent litigation 
that it could have raised during the re-
examination proceedings.30 Under the 
proposal, the third party is precluded 
from using only the actual arguments 
it raised during the opposition.
Another proposal stipulates that 
when the patent in question involves 
a combination invention, damages for 
infringement should be based on the 
incremental contribution of the pat-
ented feature to the value of the final 
product. This proposal is intended to 
address the problem of royalty stacking 
in information, communication, and 
technology industries where products 
may embody dozens or even hundreds 
of patented inventions. Some research-
ers and industry participants suspect 
that, in such environments, there is 
a tendency for courts to overestimate 
damages from the infringement of in-
dividual patents.31 They fear the result-
ing conflict over the division of profits 
may reduce the incentive to bring new 
products to market.  
Concerns about royalty stacking 
may also arise in the financial sector, 
especially given its reliance on ICT 
and the emphasis on software in its 
R&D. In particular, innovations in 
the processes used to provide financial 
services are typically cumulative in 
nature. As noted earlier, financial mar-
kets and payment systems often exhibit 
network effects. These effects create 
value for network participants that 
may complicate the estimation of the 
incremental benefit attributable to one 
of many patented inventions employed 
by a network.  
Patent Boundaries. Not all con-
cerns about business method patents 
are likely to be resolved. One major 
concern about these patents, and 
software patents more generally, is that 
their abstractness makes it difficult to 
determine the actual boundaries of the 
property rights being granted. Using 
the jargon of patent law, these patents 
often suffer from ambiguous “claims.”32 
This is problematic because if firms 
cannot determine what is protected 
and what is not, instances of inadver-
tent infringement are more likely to 
occur.  
Consider the analogy to property 
rights to land. If the boundary lines 
between properties are consistently un-
clear or frequently reinterpreted over 
time, trespassing on another’s property 
would be more difficult to avoid. Even 
worse, there may be instances in which 
a person makes significant improve-
ments to his or her property only to 
find he or she has built partially on 
another’s land. The result would be 
more litigation, and this additional risk 
might deter efficient investment in the 
first place. 
29 See the report by the Federal Trade 
Commission, the book by Stephen Merrill, 
Richard C. Levin, and Mark Myers, and the 
book by Adam Jaffe and Josh Lerner. 
30 See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). The purpose of this 
restriction is to prevent abuse of the opposition 
process.  
31 The issues are described in the article by 
Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro and formally 
modeled in Shapiro’s working paper. For some 
examples from actual cases, see the testimony 
by John Thomas.
32 In their 2008 book, James Bessen and 
Mike Meurer point out that appeals over the 
definition of claims in a business method patent 
occur more than six times as frequently as for 
(litigated) patents in general.32   Q3  2008 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
CONCLUSION 
There is, at present, very little evi-
dence to argue that business method 
patents have had a significant effect on 
the R&D investments of financial in-
stitutions. It is possible that the avail-
ability of business method patents has 
encouraged more entry and R&D by 
start-up firms or more efficient trading 
of technologies. At present, however, 
these represent intriguing possibilities 
and not outcomes that have actu-
ally been measured. In short, we still 
cannot determine whether financial 
patents are creating value for the U.S. 
economy.
Nevertheless, business method 
patents are becoming commonplace. 
Compared with many other patents, 
they are litigated more often. Some of 
this litigation has resulted in very large 
settlements paid by established provid-
ers of financial services. These facts, in 
themselves, don’t prove anything. But 
combined with the lack of evidence 
suggesting a positive effect on R&D in-
vestments, they do suggest that there is 
likely scope for improving on the cur-
rent business method patent bargain. 
From the standpoint of policy, it 
is important to ensure that patents 
are granted only for new and nonobvi-
ous business methods and that those 
standards are rigorous. In this light, 
the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR 
and the debate over the adoption of 
enhanced opposition procedures ap-
pear to be positive developments. The 
characteristics of financial markets 
— in particular, network effects and 
the requirements of interoperability 
— should affect the choice of appropri-
ate remedies for patent infringement. 
At least after the eBay decision, these 
factors may influence when a court is 
willing to grant an injunction or how 
it will determine the damages result-
ing from infringement. Each of these 
changes suggests that we may already 
be in the process of increasing the ben-
efits and reducing the costs to society 
of financial patents. But there is likely 
more work to be done.  B R
DATA APPENDIX
Counts of business method patents consist of all patents 
assigned to Class 705 (Data Processing: Financial, Business 
Practice, Management, or Cost/Price Determination) in the 
U.S. Patent Classification System. The United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) describes Class 705 as a collection 
of financial and management data processing areas, including 
insurance, trading of financial instruments, health-care man-
agement, reservation systems, computerized postage metering, 
electronic shopping, auction systems, and business cryptogra-
phy. For additional information, see http://www.uspto.gov/web/
menu/busmethp/class705.htm.
The estimate of business method patents that are more 
financial in nature is based on counts of patents falling into 
subclasses of Class 705 based on analysis of patents performed 
by CHI research in 2001. These subclasses include 1, 4, 7, 10, 
16, 26, 30, 33, 45, 53, and 64-80. These exclude many of the 
patents primarily dealing with cryptography, postage metering, 
and similar technologies less closely related to the provision of 
financial services.
The definition of software patents used to calculate the 
software share of business methods is the one specified in the 
article by Bessen and Hunt. It is based on the following search 
of the USPTO patent full-text database: “SPEC/software OR 
SPEC/computer AND program ANDNOT spec/antigen OR 
antigenic OR chromatography ANDNOT ttl/chip OR semi-
conductor OR bus OR circuit OR circuitry  AND ISD/$/$/yyyy 
AND ccl/705/$.”
The analysis of occupational data is based on the Occupa-
tional Employment Statistics compiled by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) (see http://www.bls.gov/oes/home.htm). The 
BLS has used different industrial and occupational taxonomies 
over the years. In particular, industries were defined using the 
Standard Industry Classification (SIC) system up to 2001, when 
the BLS switched to the North American Industry Classifi-
cation (NAIC) System. The BLS used its own occupational 
definitions in these data until 1999, when it adopted definitions 
based on the Census Bureau’s Standard Occupational Clas-
sification (SOC) system. In the end, I constructed two lists 
of industries and three lists of research occupations that were 
roughly comparable over time. Note that my definition of finan-
cial services excludes real estate and holding companies. Poten-
tial research occupations include computer scientists, program-
mers, software engineers, actuaries, mathematicians, operations 
researchers, statisticians, architects, cartographers, surveyors, all 
engineers, and all life, physical, and social scientists. Additional 
details are available upon request.
In the text, I suggested a potential undercounting of R&D 
workers in financial services of about 20,000. This was derived 
as follows. For all industries in 2005, the ratio of potential 
research workers to R&D workers identified by the NSF was 
2.9:1. Dividing the 147,000 potential research workers in 
financial services by 2.9 yields about 50,400 jobs, about 20,200 
more than found by the NSF. If, however, I exclude workers in 
all industries who were actuaries, operations researchers, market   
researchers, and social scientists, the ratio of potential research 
workers to NSF R&D workers falls to 2.5:1.  Excluding jobs in 
those occupations in the financial sector leaves about 98,400 
potential research workers in 2005. Dividing this number by 2.5 
yields about 39,400 jobs, about 9,200 more than reported in the 
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